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I. I ntroduction
In November 2017, a short film was screened at the meeting of the United
Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in Geneva.
Titled ‘Slaughterbots’, it showed a contractor advertising his latest product
– a small drone with artificial intelligence that has the ability to find, target
and kill.1 The film goes on to show the drones fall into the wrong hands, get
unleashed onto the world and proceed to wreak havoc by indiscriminately
shooting people in the head. 2
This dramatic, yet powerful film was screened at the CCW meeting for
a significant reason. At the time, the 2018 Group of Governmental Experts

*
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Sarvjeet Singh is the Project Manager and Research Fellow at the Centre for Communication
Governance, National Law University Delhi. Sharngan Aravindakshan is a lawyer
and Programme Officer at the Centre for Communication Governance, National Law
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Ben Brimelow, ‘The Short Film “Slaughterbots” Depicts a Dystopian Future of Killer
Drones Swarming the World’ Business Insider <https://www.businessinsider.in/the-shortfilm-slaughterbots-depicts-a-dystopian-future-of-killer-drones-swarming-the-world/articleshow/61732012.cms> accessed 9 March 2020.
ibid.
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(GGE) on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) was meeting under
the aegis of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons or CCW). Set up in December 2016 by the Fifth
Review Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW3, the GGE
has been tasked to examine “emerging technologies in the area of lethal
autonomous weapons systems in the context of the objectives and purposes
of the Convention”.4 The 2017, 2018 and 2019 iterations of the GGE concluded with reports, and the process is expected to continue in 2020-2021
as well.
The GGE on LAWS is attempting to address this profound problem of
regulating lethal autonomous weapons but their task is not easy. This is
exacerbated by the particular view that LAWS in the truly autonomous sense
do not currently exist, a view shared not only by several analysts5 but also
states.6 They argue that any attempts to regulate this technology is premature since it is almost impossible to predict how and what an actually lethal
autonomous weapon would look like in the future. Indeed, Slaughterbots
was dismissed by critics as an alarmist and exaggerated portrayal of the
‘killer robot’ technology that is popular in dystopian science fiction movies.7
But a definition of LAWS that only focuses on pure autonomy is also
problematic since it effectively excludes and ignores increasing autonomy.
Skepticism notwithstanding, it is now no longer disputed that weapons
development is steadily moving towards increasing autonomy and not less.
The role played by humans in using advanced weaponry has lessened to a
great extent, and is set to lessen further. This is perhaps not unexpected,
given that this trend is not unique to just weapons, but of technology itself,
3

4

5

6

7

Hayley Evans, ‘Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems at the First and Second U.N. GGE
Meetings’ (Lawfare, 9 April 2018) <https://www.lawfareblog.com/lethal-autonomousweapons-systems-first-and-second-un-gge-meetings> accessed 8 March 2020.
‘Report of the 2017 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons
Systems (LAWS)’ (United Nations 2017) CCW/GGE.1/2017/3 1.
Michael Schmitt, ‘Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Humanitarian Law:
A Reply to the Critics’ [2013] Harvard National Security Journal Features 6 <https://
harvardnsj.org/2013/02/autonomous-weapon-systems-and-international-humanitarian-law-a-reply-to-the-critics/> accessed 9 March 2020. See Rebecca Crootof, The Killer
Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy Implications, 36 Cardozo L Rev 1837, 1863-70 (2015).
‘Report of the 2017 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons
Systems (LAWS)’ (n 5) 7.
Paul Scharre, ‘Why You Shouldn’t Fear “Slaughterbots” - IEEE Spectrum’ IEEE Spectrum:
Technology, Engineering, and Science News (22 December 2017) <https://spectrum.ieee.
org/automaton/robotics/military-robots/why-you-shouldnt-fear-slaughterbots> accessed
10 March 2020.
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generally.8 From self-driving cars in the automotive industry to robot assisted
surgery in healthcare, the adoption of increasingly sophisticated technology
is being endorsed for reducing human error and increasing productivity and
efficiency in almost every field.
It is not surprising that the defence and national security field are no exceptions to this trend. Additionally, the dual-use nature of artificial intelligence
(AI) has been and continues to be a huge enabler.9 Strides in autonomous
navigation and data analysis can not only improve civilian navigation, but
also the mobility of drones or sentry bots, for instance.10 Machine learning
and deep learning not only have the potential to improve precision in robotic
surgery, but also precision in strike capability in autonomous weapons.
In any discussion on LAWS, it is important to distinguish between autonomyand automation simpliciter. While autonomous weaponry is relatively
new, automation of weapons technology has long been in existence. Remote
piloting is one example. In the United States, at least one in three US Air
Force aircraft is remotely piloted.11
Automation simpliciter, like the kind described above, has a certain level
of human control and is hence not the main subject of contestation. Remotely
piloted drones, for instance, do not act on their own and are instead controlled by a person who takes all the cognitive decisions. But new forms of
automation are resulting in increasing autonomy to the weapons technology,
i.e., the ability to act independently without human input. These weapons
can, in theory at least, select and engage targets on their own without any
human intervention. In fact, a South Korean company has already reportedly developed a lethal sentry robot called the SGR-A1 Sentry Guard Robot,
that can be used not only for patrolling its highly militarized border, but
also has the ability to identify targets and engage in hostilities on its own
without human intervention.12 It is this kind of technology that has led to

8

9
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Kenneth Anderson and Matthew C. Waxman, ‘Law and Ethics for Autonomous Weapon
Systems: Why a Ban Won’t Work and How the Laws of War Can’ [2013] The Hoover
Institution 33, 2.
See MaaikeVerbruggen, ‘The Role of Civilian Innovation in the Development of Lethal
Autonomous Weapon Systems’ (2019) 10 Global Policy.
ibid.
Spencer Ackerman and Noah Shachtman, ‘Almost 1 In 3 U.S. Warplanes is a Robot’ Wired
(1 September 2012) <https://www.wired.com/2012/01/drone-report/> accessed 10 March
2020.
Alexander Velez-Green, ‘The Foreign Policy Essay: The South Korean Sentry—A “Killer
Robot” to Prevent War’ (Lawfare, 1 March 2015) <https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-policy-essay-south-korean-sentry%E2%80%94-killer-robot-prevent-war> accessed
10 March 2020.
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calls for regulation, if not a total ban, on the development of such weapons
technology.
These developments have not gone unnoticed by India. Shedding its usual
reticence with issues concerning international law, India is grappling with
LAWS in a big way, first chairing the 2017 GGE session through Ambassador
Amandeep Gill, India’s permanent representative to the Conference on
Disarmament and continuing to be an active participant in the preceding
and successive sessions.13 At home, India set up a multi-stakeholder task
force under the Ministry of Defence to study the strategic implications of AI
for national security and defence whose terms of reference include recommendations for the use of both defensive and offensive AI in several areas
including aviation, naval, land systems, cyber, as well as nuclear.14 The NITI
Aayog also recently released the National Strategy on Artificial Intelligence,
setting out India’s goals vis-à-vis AI capabilities and mapping the path to
reach them.15 Clearly, India has no intention of being left out of the benefits
that LAWS could confer. But it also appears that, rather than participate
in a LAWS rat race against nations that have vastly different technological
(and indeed monetary) capabilities compared to itself, India is set on its own
course to develop, incorporate and utilize LAWS technology in a manner
that is in keeping with its own unique experiences as part of the global south.
This paper traces the politico-legal discussions surrounding autonomous
weapons and unpacks the major legal issues plaguing scholarly and governmental debates around LAWS. The authors first lay out a typology of autonomy to better understand issues and concerns with such weapons systems.
The article then examines the broad legal framework with which these weapons will be required to comply and within whose boundaries these weapons
will be required to be operated. The authors proceed to trace major States’
views on LAWS under the auspices of the United Nations Convention on
Conventional Weapons. Finally, the authors examine Indian efforts towards
increasing autonomy in defence technology and assess how best autonomous
weaponry can be deployed in the Indian scenario.
13

14

15

Bedavyasa Mohanty, ‘Amidst Calls for a Ban, India Leads the Debate on Lethal Autonomous
Weapons’ The Wire (18 November 2017) <https://thewire.in/external-affairs/amidst-callsban-india-leads-debate-lethal-autonomous-weapons> accessed 4 February 2020.
Press Information Bureau, ‘Raksha Mantri Inaugurates Workshop on AI in National
Security and Defence’ Ministry of Defence, Government of India (21 May 2018).
National Strategy on Artificial Intelligence (June, 2018), <https://niti.gov.in/writereaddata/files/document_publication/NationalStrategy-for-AI-Discussion-Paper.pdf>; See also
Yogima Sharma, ‘Niti Aayog Proposes Rs 7,500-Crore Plan for Artificial Intelligence Push’
The Economic Times (20 May 2019) <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/niti-aayog-proposes-rs-7500-crore-plan-for-artificial-intelligence-push/articleshow/69403255.cms?from=mdr> accessed 22 March 2020.
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There is currently no agreed definition for autonomous weapons.16 But the
definition used by the Department of Defence (DoD) in the United States
appears to be gaining traction. The US DoD defines an autonomous weapons system as “a weapon system that, once activated, can select and engage
targets without further intervention by a human operator.”17
To use the DoD’s phrase, “intervention by a human operator” can take
different forms. One form requires a human to direct the system to select
a target and attack it, referred to as “human-in-the-loop”.18 For instance,
fire and forget weapons that require humans to choose and zero-in on the
targets before launch are “in-the-loop” systems. In the DoD Directive, these
systems are referred to as “semi-autonomous systems”.19 The MQ-9 Reaper
used earlier this year (at the time of writing) by the US to strike and kill
Qasem Suleimani, a general of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, 20
also falls under the “in-the-loop” category.
Another form is one in which the system selects, targets and attacks them
under human oversight who can override the system’s actions if needed,
referred to as “human-on-the-loop”. 21 The Patriot air defence system which
has been in use by the United States for several years can independently
target and engage missiles and is an example of “on-the-loop” systems.22
Israel’s Iron Dome which automatically targets and engages incoming missiles from Gaza, is another example. The US DoD refers to these systems as

16
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See Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy Implications, 36
Cardozo L. Rev. 1837, 1847-54 (2015). See also Kenneth Anderson et al., Adapting the Law
of Armed Conflict to Autonomous Weapon Systems, 90 Int’l L. Stud. 386, 388-90 (2014).
U.S. Dep’t of Def., Directive 3000.09, Autonomy In Weapon Systems 13–14 (Nov. 2,
2012), available at <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300009p.pdf> [hereinafter Dod Directive 3000.09].
Bonnie Docherty, ‘Losing Humanity: The Case against Killer Robots’ (Human Rights
Watch 2012) 2.
U.S. Dep’t of Def., Directive 3000.09, Autonomy In Weapon Systems 14 (Nov. 2, 2012),
available at <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300009p.pdf> [hereinafter
Dod Directive 3000.09].
Peter Baker and others, ‘Seven Days in January: How Trump Pushed U.S. and Iran to
the Brink of War’ The New York Times (11 January 2020) <https://www.nytimes.
com/2020/01/11/us/politics/iran-trump.html> accessed 11 April 2020.
Docherty (n 19) 2.
Patriot Missile Long-Range Air-Defence System, US Army (Army Technology) <https://
www.army-technology.com/projects/patriot/> accessed 11 April 2020.
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“human-supervised autonomous systems”. 23 They are considered a type of
autonomous weapons system, as opposed to semi-autonomous systems.
A fully autonomous weapon or a human-out-of-the-loop weapon i.e., one
that can select and engage targets without any further control by humans
such as the one described by the US DoD is not yet in existence. To quote
Schmitt, these weapons have not yet “left the drawing board”. 24

III. The Legal Framework for Lethal Autonomous
Weapons
Despite LAWS being a relatively new development, inter-governmental discussions on LAWS are not taking place in vacuum. The International Court
of Justice (ICJ) in its 1996Advisory Opinion on the Legality and Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons was clear, thatinternational humanitarian law “[p]
ermeates the entire law of armed conflict and applies to all forms of warfare
and to all kinds of weapons, those of the past, those of the present and those
of the future.”25
States have also expressed little disagreement with this view, with the
GGE on LAWS achieving consensus that the development and use of LAWS
should be governed by the rules posited in international humanitarian law or
the law of armed conflict. 26 This is unlike other efforts such as the Group of
Governmental Experts on Development of Information and Communication
Technology in Cyberspace, for instance, which managed to agree on the
applicability of international law to cyberspace only as recently as 2013. 27
Despite this being reaffirmed in 201528, this consensus is still threadbare,
with states continuing to heavily contest the contours of international law in
cyberspace, rendering the certainty in the LAWS GGE all the more surprising.

23

24
25
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27

28

U.S. Dep’t of Def., Directive 3000.09, Autonomy In Weapon Systems 13 (Nov. 2, 2012),
available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300009p.pdf [hereinafter Dod
Directive 3000.09].
Schmitt (n 6) 3.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1. C.J. Reports 1996
(“Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons”), para 86.
‘Report of the 2017 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons
Systems (LAWS)’ (n 5) para 16(b).
‘Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information
and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security’ (2013) A/68/98 para 19.
‘Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information
and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security’ (2015) A/70/174 para
25.
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Since international humanitarian law is applicable, all weapons are
required to be capable of being used and also be used in accordance with its
rules. 29 Under these rules, weapons can either be unlawful per se or can be
used in an unlawful manner. The two rules under which weapons can be per
se unlawful are (a) Means or methods of warfare that cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering are prohibited.30
(b) Weapons that are by nature indiscriminate, i.e., weapons that cannot
be targeted at a specific military objective, are prohibited.31
The first rule is the reason why blinding lasers that cause permanent blindness are banned per se,since they are perceived to cause ‘superfluous injury’,
which means that they cause suffering without any military purpose.32 Other
examples include weapons that have the effect of injuring through non-detectable fragments which ordinarily cannot be detected using X-rays and
hence, cannot be treated and cause suffering.33 The ICJ has also noted that
this prohibition ensures that “States do not have unlimited freedom of choice
of means in the weapons they use”34, as well as declared the rule as one of the
“cardinal principles contained in the texts constituting the fabric of international humanitarian law”35.
The second rule covers anti-personnel mines, for instance, which obviously do not discriminate between combatants and civilians. These mines
can also remain active for a long time even after the end of the conflict, and
endanger civilians.36 Although the ban on mines is imposed under a separate
convention, that is, the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention, the source of the
underlying principle is the same.

29

30
31
32
33

34
35
36

Neil Davison, ‘A Legal Perspective: Autonomous Weapon Systems under International
Humanitarian Law’ (International Committee of the Red Cross) UNODA Occasional Papers
No 30 7 <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=r ja&uac t= 8&ved=2ahU K Ew i Z7t Kcg L DoA hU LbisK H Vyi A x kQFjAC egQI B R A B &u rl= ht t p s%3A%2 F %2 F w w w. i c rc .or g%2 Fe n%2 Fdow n lo ad%2 Ff i le%
2F65762%2Fautonomous_weapon_systems_under_international_humanitarian_law.
pdf&usg=AOvVaw3Yo2nsxEEsyDwKBvi9K07G> accessed 23 March 2020.
Art 35(2), Additional Protocol II.
Art 51(4), Additional Protocol I.
Schmitt (n 6) 9.
Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol II), Annexed to Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons, 185.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (n 26), para 78.
ibid.
Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed
Conflict (Cambridge University Press 2004) 68.
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Weapons that are not themselves rendered unlawful by the rule against
causing superfluous injury and the prohibition on indiscriminate weapons,
can still be used unlawfully, if used in violation of certain principles - the
principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack.37
The principle of distinction requires distinguishing between the civilian
population and the combatants as well as between civilian objects and military objectives and ensuring action only against military objectives.38 The
principle of proportionality refers to the rule that legitimate target may not
be attacked if the collateral civilian casualties would be disproportionate
to the specific military gain from the attack.39 While it cannot be identified
from any one rule, it can be gathered from several provisions in Additional
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.40 The principle of precautions
in attack refers to the obligation upon those who plan or decide upon an
attack to take certain active precautions including verification to ensure the
objectives are military, choosing means and methods to minimize incidental
civilian injury and refraining from launching an attack that would be in
breach of the principle of proportionality.41 These principles place obligations upon combatants, who will also be liable for violations thereof.42
Separately, Article 36 of the Additional Protocol I mandates a legal review
of all new weapons, means and methods of warfare to determine whether
their employment would in some or all circumstances be prohibited by any
rule in international law.43 This provision has particular significance vis-àvis autonomous weapons, since it requires countries to assess whether the
use of a projected weapon could breach international humanitarian law.
According to Dinstein, it is those weapons whose “normal or expected
use” would violate IHL prohibitions that would be per se unlawful44, as
opposed to regular weaponry that could potentially be used in breach of any
of the precautionary, distinctive or proportionality principles.
Lastly, the Martens Clause, which requires that in cases not covered by
existing treaties, civilians and combatants remain protected by customary

37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

Davison (n 30) 7.
Art 48, Additional Protocol I.
Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (n 26), p. 587.
ibid.
Dinstein (n 37) 125.
Davison (n 30) 7.
Art 36, Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, 1977.
Dinstein (n 37) 80.
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IHL, the principles of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience45,
is also considered a yardstick to evaluate autonomous weapons.

IV. To Ban

or

Not

to

Ban? Some Legal

Considerations
Autonomous weapons are a subject of major controversy, leaving states as
well as experts sharply divided. As of November 2018, 28 states have called
for a ban on fully autonomous weapons,46 while several of the developed
states, including Russia, United Kingdom and the United States are in opposition to any pre-emptive ban47. Leading the charge against LAWS, Human
Rights Watch (HRW) and Harvard Law School’s International Human
Rights Clinic in 2012 issued a seminal report titled “Losing Humanity- The
Case Against Killer Robots”, in which they have articulated their arguments
for a pre-emptive ban.
On the other hand, there are those who feel that a pre-emptive ban is
premature, among whom Michael Schmitt, a professor at the US Naval War
College, figures prominently.48 In a detailed rebuttal to Losing Humanity,
Schmitt has responded to HRW’s arguments and has laid out the case for
why LAWS, like other weapons, can confirm to international humanitarian
law. Despite the flux of time, these two opposing views still embody the
main cases for and against LAWS and are discussed below. It is important
to bear in mind that this discussion pertains to fully autonomous weapons
which are still only a futuristic prospect, and not increasingly autonomous
or automated weapons.
In Losing Humanity, HRW lays the charge that fully autonomous weapons are per se illegal since they would be incapable of “abiding by the key
principles of international humanitarian law”49, which according to the
report, consist of the principles of (a) distinction, (b) proportionality, (c) military necessity and (d) the Martens Clause. For his part, Schmitt has argued
that this is not the case.

45

46
47

48

49

Preamble to the 1907 Hague Convention IV; art 63, Geneva Convention I; art 1(2),
Additional Protocol I; Preamble to Additional Protocol II.
‘Country Views on Killer Robots’ (Campaign to Stop Killer Robots 2018).
Damien Gayle, ‘UK, US and Russia among Those Opposing Killer Robot Ban’ The
Guardian (29 March 2019) <https://www.theguardian.com/science/2019/mar/29/uk-usrussia-opposing-killer-robot-ban-un-ai> accessed 5 April 2020.
Schmitt (n 6); Anderson and Waxman (n 9); Rebecca Crootof, ‘The Killer Robots Are Here:
Legal And Policy Implications’ 36 Cardozo Law Review 79.
Docherty (n 19) 30.
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A. Distinction
Firstly, HRW argues that fully autonomous weapons would not be able to
conform to the principle of distinction, i.e., they would not have the ability
to sense or interpret the difference between soldiers and harmless civilians,
especially in contemporary combat environments, 50 thereby being per se illegal. It gives the example of human soldiers being capable of recognizing
children with toy guns enabling them to refrain from attack, as opposed to
a robot which would only be able to sense two armed individuals and may
very well proceed to eliminate them.51
To this, Schmitt argues that even fully autonomous weapons that are completely incapable of distinguishing between combatants and civilians are not
per se unlawful, since they can be deployed in purely military battlespaces in
which civilian presence is highly unlikely, such as naval warships, or remote
parts of a desert.52 This argument is similar to the one made in defence of
the legality of nuclear weapons before the ICJ by the United Kingdom during
the hearings leading up to the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion.53 In that case, the
United Kingdom had also argued that it was incorrect to argue that nuclear
weapons can per se be illegal on account of the principle of distinction since
it could be used in areas where civilians are completely absent or have a high
likelihood of absence.54 The fact that the ICJ was ultimately unable to rule
that nuclear weapons were illegal, preferring instead to rule that it simply
could not rule either way, is telling.
Schmitt also argues that military technology is advancing and that software enabling visual identification of individuals is likely to be developed55,
as well as points out that enemies disguise themselves as civilians all the time
and even regular human-operated machines have been thwarted by this56.
Additionally, he questions HRW’s assumption of human-operated weaponry’s superiority over autonomous ones by referring to the US warship, the
USS Vincennes, accidentally engaging an Iranian airliner carrying civilians
in 1992, since it mistakenly believed they were about to attack the ship.57

50
51
52
53

54
55
56
57

ibid.
ibid 32.
Schmitt (n 6) 11.
Para 3.70, Statement of the Government of the United Kingdom, Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons (Request for an Advisory Opinion by the United Nations General
Assembly), International Court of Justice (June 1995).
ibid.
Schmitt (n 6) 11.
ibid 12.
ibid 13.
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This led to the Iranian airliner being shot down, killing all 290 passengers
on board.58

B. Proportionality
Secondly, HRW argues that full autonomy in weaponry would not allow
compliance with the rule of proportionality in international humanitarian
law, since it requires “human judgement”.59 Drawing on several sources,
including the US Air Force60, HRW asserts that determining whether the
expected collateral damage exceeds the anticipated military advantage is
a highly subjective exercise that can only be determined on a case-to-case
basis61. It quotes the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) which held that to determine whether an attack is proportionate,
“it is necessary to examine whether a reasonably well-informed person in
the circumstances of the actual perpetrator, making reasonable use of the
information available to him or her, could have expected excessive civilian
casualties to result from the attack”.62
Taking the example of a robot dealing with enemies in a populous urban
area, HRW asserts that assessments of proportionality are required to be
made in constantly evolving situations with numerous, changing factors,
which can never be “boiled down to a simple algorithm”.63
This argument also does not convince Schmitt who, while acknowledging that proportionality assessment is highly context related, again relies on
advancing technology to rebut HRW. Schmitt admits that proportionality
calculations require careful balancing of expected collateral damage and
anticipated military advantage.64 But then he points to existing methodologies in use for calculating expected collateral damage, such as the “collateral
damage estimate methodology” (CDEM), whereby an attack force considers
58

59
60

61
62

63
64

Michael R. Gordon, ‘U.S. Account of Downing of Iran Jet Criticized’ The New York Times
(2 July 1992) <https://www.nytimes.com/1992/07/02/world/us-account-of-downing-ofiran-jet-criticized.html> accessed 5 April 2020.
Docherty (n 19) 32.
Air Force Judge Advocate General’s Department, “Air Force Operations and the Law: A
Guide for Air and Space Forces” first edition, 2002, <http://web.law.und.edu/Class/militarylaw/web_assets/pdf/AF%20Ops%20&%20Law.pdf> (accessed April 5, 2020), p.27.
Docherty (n 19) 33.
Prosecutor v Stanislav Gali, International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (ICTY), Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment and
Opinion, December 5, 2003, <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.
pdf> (accessed October 4, 2012), para. 58.
Docherty (n 19) 34.
Schmitt (n 6) 19.
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“factors as the precision of a weapon, its blast effect, attack tactics, the probability of civilian presence in structures near the target, and the composition
of structures to estimate the number of civilian casualties likely to be caused
during an attack”.65 According to Schmitt, since such programs are themselves reliant on scientific algorithms, weapons systems that are incorporated
with them should be “no less likely to generate a reliable result” as far as
expected collateral damage is concerned.66
With regard to assessing the anticipated military advantage, Schmitt is less
certain given the “complexity and fluidity of the modern battlespace”, and
acknowledges that impressive advances in military intelligence notwithstanding, it is “unlikely in the near future” that machines will be programmable
to perform robust assessments of a strike’s military advantage.67 However,
he still maintains that military advantage algorithms could theoretically be
programmed into machines68 and in any case, sees no reason why, pending
the development of such technology, this should necessitate a pre-emptive
ban on autonomous weapons. He also relies on the International Committee
of the Red Cross’s (ICRC) authoritative commentary which states that the
proportionality test allows for a “fairly broad margin of judgement” and
“must above all be a question of common sense and good faith for military
commanders”69 to conclude that neither humans nor machines are held to
a standard of perfection and that the applicable standard in international
humanitarian law is always a standard of reasonableness70.

C. Military Necessity
Next, HRW believes that fully autonomous weaponry will also cause friction with the requirements of military necessity.71 According to the ICRC,
the principle of military necessity in international humanitarian law permits
measures which are actually necessary to accomplish a legitimate military
purpose and are not otherwise prohibited by international humanitarian
law.72 HRW argues in Losing Humanity that the very development of LAWS
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will render them militarily necessary, thereby propagating their widespread
use by nations.73
Schmitt simply argues that this would not render LAWS unlawful per se
and in any case, the other requirements of distinction and mainly proportionality render any assessment of LAWS against military necessity superfluous.74 Schmitt also criticizes HRW’s understanding of military necessity as a
separate principle on its own, as opposed to being “a foundational principle
that undergirds the entire body of law”.75

D. Martens Clause
Finally, HRW also argues that any usage of LAWS causes serious concerns
under the Martens Clause.76 The Martens Clause provides that in cases not
covered by existing treaties, civilians and combatants remain protected by
customary IHL, the principles of humanity, and the dictates of the public
conscience.7778 The ICRC also agrees with HRW, having expressed the view
that the Martens Clause is the link between ethical considerations and IHL,
making it “particularly relevant to the assessment of autonomous weapon
systems”.79 The ICJ in the Advisory Opinion had also observed that the
Martens Clause “proved to be an effective means of addressing rapid evolution of military technology.”80
HRW relies on a study conducted by Ronald Arkin, an American roboticist, the results of which indicated that the majority of the participants found
it unacceptable that autonomous weapons could be used to take human
lives.81 Taking this to indicate the “dictates of the public conscience”, HRW
argues that there was no willingness among the public to accept the deployment of LAWS and therefore, any such use or deployment would fall foul of
the Martens Clause.82
Schmitt’s response to this is that by its own wording the Martens Clause
is only applicable in cases not covered by existing treaties.83 Schmitt believes
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that since international humanitarian law already extensively covers LAWS,
there is no requirement to evaluate LAWS against the Martens Clause.84

E. Who won?
Losing Humanity effectively captures the major legal issues plaguing discussions of autonomous weaponry. HRW is right to warn governments and
the rest of the world about the challenges inherent in LAWS that will make
compliance with the tenets of the law of armed conflict difficult. Schmitt’s
response to HRW’s challenges, while an excellent counter on law, is somewhat over-reliant on the promise of advancing technology and its potential
to match up to human-levels of judgement and consciousness.
Scientists and technologists themselves dispute this optimism. Noel
Sharkey, a leading roboticist who has long called for a ban on LAWS, believes
it unlikely that computing machinery will meet the requisite standards in
the foreseeable future and that while improvements are expected, significant
change enabling reliability is also not likely.85 Sharkey stated that “humanlevel discrimination with adequate common sense reasoning and battlefield
awareness may be computationally intractable”.86 Sharkey also believes that
while computers are better than humans at tasks such as calculating numbers, searching large data sets and simultaneously carrying out repetitive
tasks, humans are better than computers at other tasks such as deliberative
reasoning, reasoning inductively and exercising meaningful judgement.87 An
open letter was also issued in 2017, to the CCW by the founders of 116 leading AI and robotics companies across 26 countries, warning the CCW about
the “pandora’s box” that will be opened should nations proceed with LAWS
development and use.88
But Schmitt’s response contained some solutions as well. He is correct in
stating that LAWS do not have todistinguish if only used in purely combat
zones, such as naval warships at sea or remote desert locations. Other rules
such as proportionality will still have to be complied with, but the fact that
the technology to do so does not exist now does not mean that countries
84
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should not try to develop it. Ultimately, Schmitt’s argument can be boiled
down to this – that autonomous weapons are by themselves not illegal under
IHL and there is no requirement for a pre-emptive ban on the development
of autonomous weapons right now. The authors find it difficult to disagree.
Cognizant of both sides of the argument, States have already advanced
past this and introduced several nuances in the debate under the aegis of the
CCW. It also appears that the concerns raised in Losing Humanity have not
gone unheard, with several States acknowledging the necessity of human
involvement in the functioning of autonomous weaponry to ensure compliance with IHL, and several having already declared that they will not be
developing fully autonomous weaponry, that is, weaponry that can fully
function without human involvement.
Japan, for instance, announced in its Working Paper presented to the 2019
GGE that it does not plan to develop fully autonomous weapons systems.89
The United States has also acknowledged that it believes human-involvement is necessary.90 This led to the introduction of the concept of meaningful human control over weapons systems as well as an attempt to identify
mechanisms in IHL, such as those under Article 36 of Additional Protocol I
to the Geneva Conventions, to permit the controlled development of LAWS
that are compliant with IHL.

V. Towards

a

Common Understanding – The GGE
LAWS

on

In 2016, the Fifth Review Conference of the High Contracting Parties to
the CCW decided to establish a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on
LAWS with the goal to “explore and agree on possible recommendations on
options related to emerging technologies in the area of LAWS”.91 Informal
expert meetings under the aegis of the CCW were already taking place since
2014 and states formally joined the discussions in the form of the GGE starting 2017. It was subsequently reconvened in 2018 and also had a 2019 session which concluded in November 2019. The 2017 report acknowledged
the applicability of international humanitarian law to all weapons systems
89
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as well as recognized the importance of assessing aspects of human-machine
interaction.92
The 2018 GGE achieved considerable progress, evolving a set of Guiding
Principles applicable to LAWS.93 These include IHL’s full applicability to
LAWS, the necessity of retaining human responsibility for decisions on the
use of weapon systems as well as studies needing to be carried out by individual states to determine whether a weapon, means or method of warfare
would be prohibited under international law.94 The 2019 Report added one
principle to this, namely, aspects of human machine interaction in the development, deployment and use of emerging technologies in the area of lethal
autonomous weapons systems’.95
While the GGE has discussed several important aspects related to autonomous weapons throughout its sessions, most discussions centre around what
the nature and level of the human-machine interaction should be, as well as
how to have in-built compliance with IHL in autonomous weapons, or at
least, increasingly autonomous weapons. In a way, the nature of human control as well as the legal review mechanisms under IHL have formed central
themes.

A. Human Control
The idea of retaining human-control has been around at least since the informal expert meetings in 2014.96 It seems states agree that giving full autonomy
to weapons systems would not augur well, neither under technological wisdom as scholars such as Sharkey have espoused, nor under IHL. The result
is that there is an “effective consensus” that human control is essential.97
Now, encompassing terms such as human-in-the-loop and human-on-theloop, the term “meaningful human control” and its variations such as “effective human control” have gained prominence. The ICRC has also called for
meaningful human control to be maintained over weapons systems.98
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This was also echoed by India in its statement to the 2019 GGE on the
human element in the use of lethal force, in which it affirmed that “human
control must be maintained over all weapons systems” including LAWS.99
Apart from this, India also expressly rejected full autonomy with no communication link or control since it “contradicts the basic operational tenets
of decision making based on situational awareness and operational control
by the commander”.100 India also stated that it believed human-in-the-loop
was “ideal” but quick reaction systems may need to be governed by at least
humans on the loop.101
Some countries have expressed different views. The United States,
although agreeing that human involvement is necessary, believes that terms
such as “control” may not be helpful.102 In a working paper submitted to
the 2018 GGE, the US sets out its position on human-machine interaction
and why it prefers to use the term “levels of human judgement over the use
of force” instead.103 It cites its Department of Defence Directive 3000.09
which requires that autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems “be
designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels
of human judgment over the use of force.”104 “Human judgment” in this
sense differs from “control” in that it involves broader human involvement in
decisions about how, when, where, and why the weapon will be employed105,
whereas “control” could require a much higher level of power or restraint
over the weapon.
The US argues that the key issue or human-machine interaction in emerging technologies in the area of LAWS is “ensuring that machines help effectuate the intention of commanders and the operators of weapons systems”.106
Enabling “human judgement”, it believes, is a better way of achieving this
than focusing on “control”. The US also criticizes the emphasis on “control”
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since how each weapons system is controlled is often specific to that weapons
system and this can vary from system to system.107
Russia for its part has also acknowledged that human control over the
operation of such systems is an “important limiting factor.”108 However, significantly, it also states that it believes specific forms and methods of human
control should remain at the discretion of States.109 Australia’s view of control appears to overlap with the legal review process under Article 36 of
Additional Protocol I. In its working paper, it presents a broad concept of
control that “incrementally builds upon itself, embedding controls onto military processes and capability at all stages of their design, development, training and usage”.110 It appears to take a weapons system-specific approach,
indicating that control will be “tailored to the specific AWS and its unique
operating environment”.111 Even though this may be a useful way to operationalize control, as opposed to a broad based, one-size-fits-all “human
control” concept that has to be applied to all weapons system, it is hard to
see how states can avoid elaborating or fleshing out minimum principles, or
redlines at the very least, for establishing human control.

B. Legal Review Mechanisms: Article 36 of Additional
Protocol I
The other hotly contested issue in the GGE for LAWS is the question of carrying out legal reviews of weapons under Article 36 of Additional Protocol I.
Article 36 mandates states to “determine whether [a new weapon’s] employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this protocol or
by any other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting
Party”.112 This applies equally to means or methods of war as well.113
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According to the ICRC, the lawfulness of an autonomous weapons system
will depend on its specific characteristics and whether, given those characteristics, it can be employed in conformity with the rules of IHL in all circumstances in which it is intended and expected to be used.114 Such a legal
review must also necessarily consider treaty and customary prohibitions and
restrictions on specific weapons, as well as the general IHL rules applicable
to all weapons, means and methods of warfare.115
The ICRC goes on to state that “such a review entails fully understanding
the weapon’s capabilities and foreseeing its effects, notably through verification and testing” and that the legal review must demand a “very high level
of confidence” that the autonomous weapon system would “predictably and
reliably operate as intended”.116 HRW has expressed the view that “these
reviews should begin in the early stages of development, address all configurations of the weapons, and consider such key principles of international
humanitarian law as distinction, proportionality, and military necessity” as
well as the Martens Clause.117
States such as Australia, New Zealand and Austria, among others, have
expressed the view that rigorous compliance with the requirements of Article
36 would ensure compliance with international law.118 However, the fact that
several countries have not ratified Additional Protocol I, including India, is
a significant problem with looking to Article 36 as a way of ensuring LAWS
compliance with IHL. One solution to this is accepting the view offered by
the ICRC119 as well as scholars120, that Article 36 is reflective of customary
international law. Despite not having ratified Additional Protocol I, Israel121
and United States still follow a detailed weapons review mechanism.
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Another problem with relying on Article 36 is that there is no standardized
procedure for such review even among states parties to Additional Protocol
I. Each country adopting its own review mechanisms may not ensure a
uniform development, let alone usage of LAWS. This has led to a call for
national contributions in the GGE on how each state understands and carries out weapons review to try and formulate some form of ‘best practices’
that can be applied across the board.
The United States, Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom have all expressed keenness to collate national contributions detailing compliance under Article 36.122 China, on the other hand, has doubted
the effectiveness of review mechanisms in ensuring compliance with IHL
given the complexity of automated systems and has also voiced concerns that
reviews may pose a risk of legitimizing “undesirable” weapons.123

C. Other Issues
Several other issues were also topics of discussion in the GGE, such as the
form any regulation of LAWS would take. In the 2018 GGE, Austria, Brazil
and Chile proposed a mandate to negotiate a legally-binding instrument,124
emphasizing that clarity could only be provided through a legal instrument.
Despite receiving majority support including from the African Union, the
Non-Aligned Movement and even China125, this proposal was effectively
blocked by the US and Russia, among others, who feel such a treaty would
be premature.126 As scholars have also noted, one strong argument for rejecting a binding treaty is the lack of an agreed definition for LAWS.127
Another suggestion came from Argentina, Australia and United Kingdom,
who proposed continuing discussions on LAWS128, presumably through
forums such as the GGE under the CCW.
A third way was proposed by France and Germany, who called for a
“political declaration” to identify areas of consensus and formulate guiding
principles.129 This approach also gained some traction, with ten other states
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supporting it.130 Belgium also supported this view, stating that it did not preclude later options such as binding treaties.131
Several states also renewed the call for a ban, which was predictably
opposed by states such as Russia and the US. Interestingly, China supports
a ban, but only as far as using LAWS is concerned.132 Given that China
is developing its own LAWS133 this is understandably viewed as a strategic
move by China to buy itself time till it deems itself LAWS-capable.134

VI. Back Home: I ndia A nd Lethal Autonomous
Weapons
India has seen a renewed focus on issues pertaining to defence and national
security in the last decade. The “surgical strike” on Pakistani soil in response
to the Pathankot terrorist attack in 2016 was meant to show the world that
India had no qualms about resorting to military strength should it be subjected to attacks such as the one at Uri.135 Similarly, the Pulwama attack in
2019, in which a convoy transporting paramilitary personnel was blown up
leaving at least 40 dead in Jammu & Kashmir, was responded to with airstrikes by the Indian Air Force deep inside Pakistan territory in Balakot.136
In subsequent instances, the Indian Government, speaking strongly
through senior voices, has made it clear that it will not hesitate to “cross
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border(s)”137 or “take steps to disrupt”138 operations against India. The
Doklam standoff is another instance where foreign aggression, in this case
Chinese, was met with an equally strong response from the Indian side.139
But despite defence and national security taking centre stage, India’s military-spending is still not comparable to countries such as China, Russia and
the United States. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute, China has the highest increase in military spending in the past decade. It saw a rise of about 83% in China, as opposed to a mere 29% in India.
In contrast, the US reduced its military spending in the past decade by about
17%, but despite this, it is still by far the largest spender in the world, spending more than twice China’s own military-budget.140 As the Parliamentary
Standing Committee on Defence (2017-18) noted, even Pakistan’s expenditure on defence was higher that India, at 3.3% of its GDP.141
Accordingly, China, Russia and the US are all ahead of India in the race
to develop LAWS and associated technology. At the moment, India spends
between 2-2.5% of its GDP on defence. Even if it were to ramp up this
amount to 3% as recommended by the Standing Committee142 , the difference
in GDP alone with the abovementioned countries would make it difficult to
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close this gap. Merely increasing and diverting funds to developing and / or
acquiring LAWS in a direction-less manner would be pointless.
India might be better off utilizing the funds it has to develop and utilize LAWS in ways that are more suited to it. India simply cannot afford to
expend its resources taking part in a LAWS rat-race that it mostly cannot
win in any case. It can, however, rationalize and tailor LAWS development
to suit it in ways that are unique to its situation.

A. LAWS as a Solution for India’s Border Woes
Apart from a shift in India’s national security policy, the Pathankot, Balakot
and Doklam incidents also highlight something crucial - that India’s biggest
security concerns remain at its borders, flanked by two more or less hostile
nations.
India’s borders are among the world’s most militarized. The total length
of India’s international land border is 15,106.7 kms, in which the border
with Pakistan is 3,323 kms long and the border with China is 3,488 kms
long.143 Other significant land borders include the Indo-Myanmar border
which is 1,643 kms and the Indo-Bangladesh border which is 4,096.7 kms.144
To guard these borders, India employs the world’s largest border security
force (“BSF”) consisting of over 2.5 million personnel.145
However, employing huge numbers of manpower to guard long borders
brings with it its own problems. Their salaries and pensions are required
to be paid, which already form a significant portion of the defence budget.
The Union Budget for 2020-21 saw the highest proportion of the defence
budget, a whopping 30%, go towards salaries, while pensions account for
28.4%.146 In contrast, capital outlay which typically includes expenditure on
purchasing defence equipment, weaponry, aircrafts, naval ships, land, and
construction of roads and bridges in border areas, only account for 23%.147
It is obvious that revenue expenses such as salaries and pensions are causing
a strain on the defence budget, with the result that capital expenditure such
as modernization and procurement end up taking a backseat.
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One reason for this is India’s over-reliance on personnel. The Indian army
currently has the world’s largest ground force.148 China, which until recently
had the largest army, has massively downsized its own forces in a strong
modernization push started in 2015 and has now reportedly cut its ground
forces by half.149
This is where India can take advantage of the force-multiplier effect of
autonomous weapons.150 They can easily supplement border patrol forces
such as the BSF in surveillance and detection. Larger aircraft like the MQ-1B
Predator, for instance, can track terrorists and their movement.151 The RQ-11
Raven, a smaller, hand-launched drone originally developed for the US military, can provide patrolling troops with reconnaissance on demand.152 A
deployment of several of South Korea’s SGR-A1 Sentry Guard Robots would
also be immensely useful in patrolling both dangerous and long borders such
as the Indo-Pakistan border. Israel has used armed ground robots to patrol
its Gaza border.153 Such robots can be programmed to always have humans
in-the-loop as well, defusing any possibility of them going rogue.
Some movement in this direction is already taking place. India is already
focusing on increasing automation, if not autonomy. The Comprehensive
Integrated Border Management System (CIBMS) which has been described
as involving “deployment of a range of state-of-the-art surveillance technologies — thermal imagers, infra-red and laser-based intruder alarms, aerostats
for aerial surveillance, unattended ground sensors that can help detect intrusion bids, radars, sonar systems to secure riverine borders, fibre-optic sensors
and a command and control system that shall receive data from all surveillance devices in real time.”154 Two pilot projects along the Indo-Pakistan
border, the Indo-Bangladesh border as well as in Jammu are reportedly operationalized.155 To be clear, the CIBMS is part of the BSF’s modernization
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push in terms of equipment to supplement border surveillance capabilities.
It should not to be mistaken for autonomous weaponry such as the South
Korea’s SGR-A1, which the CIBMS is as yet a far cry from.
The CIBMS would continuously collect feed and transmit to BSF personnel who would, in case of threats, intervene in the form of Quick Response
Teams (QRTs) and neutralize them.156 Although the CIBMS primarily envisages the use of detection and surveillance equipment such as sensors and
satellite imagery, the use of drones and other unmanned aerial vehicles will
also be considered.157
Proper implementation of the CIBMS involving the use of both automated
and autonomous solutions would greatly alleviate India’s border woes. Of
course, given the current level of technology, AI and other technological
solutions can only be a force-multiplier and not completely displace the foot
soldier. But it would still go a long way towards reducing India’s human
resource problems and budgetary constraints. BSF soldiers work in harsh
conditions. The Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on
Home Affairs has also noted and expressed its anguish that basic amenities
are often not provided to the BSF jawans under a system that does not permit them to get sufficient rest on account of manpower shortages.158 This
results in ever-increasing numbers of BSF personnel, also pushing up salaries and pensions, both exacerbating the defence budget’s revenue to capital
ratio as well as delaying modernization efforts. Technology can off-set this
somewhat.
A cautious approach to the development and use of LAWS in sync with
its own unique needs would also synchronize with India’s approach to civilian AI. In this regard, the NITI Aayog has recently argued for taking an
approach to AI that was inclusive, sustainable and tailored to India’s unique
needs. Although only dealing with civilian application of AI, the discussion
paper titled “National Strategy for Artificial Intelligence #AIFORALL” has
identified sectors that AI growth in India should focus on - healthcare, agriculture, education, smart cities and infrastructure as well as smart mobility
and transportation. The document is underpinned by a philosophy of “AI for
156
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the Greater Good” which ensures social and inclusive growth. Given India’s
large digital divide and social inequities, this is important.

VII. Conclusion
Autonomous weaponry, whether lethal or not, is inevitable. The authors of
Losing Humanity are to be credited for strongly bringing to the fore several
innate issues with autonomous weaponry, both in of itself as well as its use,
but in a world of international law that is constantly shaped by real-politik,
their arguments about its inherent illegality, while compelling from an ethical point of view, do not hold much legal merit. Of course, this also does
not mean that the world is definitely heading towards a Terminator-like dystopian scenario. States will continue to be guided and constrained in their
development and use of these weapons by international humanitarian law.
The difficulties in applying IHL as detailed in this paper will no doubt be
hard to overcome. But this is not the first time existing law is being interpreted to accommodate new and possibly unfathomable technologies, as the
International Court of Justice also noted in the famous Advisory Opinion
on Nuclear Weapons case.
A positive development is how States are already seriously considering
these issues and expressing their views. Although autonomous weaponry is
already in use by States, it is employed only by a handful of them and even
these States have not advanced irrevocably down the autonomy line. Hence,
the law may not be too far behind technology in this field, and the legal principles that evolve from these ongoing discussions can help both inform and
direct the growth of autonomous weaponry. That is the ultimate goal of the
inter-governmental discussions on autonomous weaponry.
Meanwhile, arguments for and against autonomous weapons will continue to be raised even as technology reaches new levels of automation and
autonomy and not all of these arguments will be purely legal. Some of the
strongest arguments raised against autonomous weapons and that their
advocates find themselves forced to defend are ethical, or even philosophical. Is it morally right to allow a machine to decide whether or not to kill a
human being? This question gains all the more importance given views like
those of Sharkey’s, that technology will never advance to the point where
a machine can feel as a human does. Paul Scharre takes this question out
of the realm of hypotheticals and moral conjecturing into the real world to
show us the stark consequences. In his book Army of None - Autonomous
Weapons and the Future of War, he writes of his experience as a US Navy
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Seal in Afghanistan and how he and his team had faced a young girl of
around 6 years old who, under the pretext of herding cattle, was actually
keeping a watch for the Taliban insurgents and had possibly even signalled
to the Taliban of Scharre’s team’s presence in the area.159 Scharre goes on to
note in his book that while she was a lawful target under IHL, the question
of shooting a child in such a situation had not even come up in his team.160
But he wonders whether a machine would have made the same choice, or
whether, based on the danger the girl presented, the machine would have
chosen to eliminate her.161 It is telling that the answer can never be in the
realm of certainty.
On the other hand, advocates of autonomous weapons, unfazed by these
arguments, present their own compelling reasons. A robot does not rape,
they say.162 A robot also does not pillage or succumb to fear or frenzy in
the way humans in the heat of war can. They would also be correct. As one
scholar noted, “only humans can be inhuman and only human beings can
deliberately choose not to comply with the rules they were instructed to follow.”163 Arriving at the right answer in the face of these arguments is incredibly difficult. We have not attempted to address these issues in this paper, for
reasons concerning both expertise and space constraints, since these complex issues deserve dedicated attention. But they are certainly important and
merit in-depth examination.
Both cyber power and weaponization of AI are changing the face of modern warfare.164 With regard to India’s role in the larger scheme of autonomous weaponry, her active participation in the Group of Governmental
Experts is heartening. But any claims of her playing a major leading role
would, for the foreseeable future, be exaggerated. India is already lagging
behind the United States and China, in defence expenditure and more importantly, defence modernization.
Aside from defence technology, India is currently not among the main
competitors even in the AI race, unlike China which is going head to head
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with the United States in terms of research and the number of publications
on AI in scientific journals.165 Defence experts have also expressed the view
that there is a “void in terms of doctrines and perspective plans when it
comes to exploitation of AI / robotics technologies.166 The Defence Research
and Development Organization, the government’s premier agency for military research and development is also viewed as inadequate and unlikely to
produce timely and meaningful results.167 The CIBMS scheme is a step in the
right direction as regards modernization for India’s defence, but slow and
unwieldy procurement processes hinder rapid progress.
Also, while the government is making it evident that they are conscious of
these issues, efforts do not appear to be enough. The report of the Defence
Ministry sanctioned Task Force which was commissioned to “study the
whole gamut of issues surrounding strategic implications of AI in national
security perspective, in global context” was not disclosed to the public, even
though the transparency and multi-stakeholder consultation would have
benefitted the government.168
It is also evident that given the difference in situations, India would be
better off using LAWS as a force multiplier rather than seek to develop offensive capabilities that are not suited to its unique needs. Even this will require
India to take several steps first, such as developing doctrinal and conceptual
determinations of AI application, field trials, impact examination and so
on.169 At the same time, India would be well-advised to continue playing an
active role in LAWS at international forums , since it can ensure its interests
are not ignored in the development of the law around LAWS. Similar to
several other global fora, the GGE on LAWS is also pervaded by inequalities
and a tension between the developed countries such as the United States,
the United Kingdom and Russia arguing against a ban, having the resources
and the expertise to pursue advancements in autonomous weaponry, and the
developing or least developed countries, who find themselves having to argue
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for a ban in an attempt to keep the playing field level.170 This is something
India will have to navigate.
On the whole, it seems likely that the dust around the issue of autonomous
weapons is not going to settle for a while yet. This is because no matter how
much the law can try and regulate its growth, discussions around their legality will continue to be at least partly in the realm of conjecture until LAWS
are actually put to use and the consequences become evident. The aim of
this paper is to illustrate or highlight the main legal issues in this important
debate on autonomous weaponry, an essential task given the scarcity of academic opinion on the subject from Indian scholars.
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